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ABSTRACT 
The economic reform of 1960's in Czechoslovakia attempted switch to the 
Socialist Market Economy. That raised the question of compatibility of 
central planning with the market mechanism. This paper tries to show, that 
the Soviet-type Command planning is truly incompatible with market. The 
plans that would be compatible must be flexible, nonobligatory and 
probabilistic. They must not prescribe specific compulsory targets, but 
rather recommend ranges of desirable output and other indicators, and they 
should be frequently adjusted to changing conditions. 
 
Note: Ideas contained in this paper arose during 
collaboration and discussions with Pavel Pelikan. He is the 
author of some concepts and terms (like the distinction 
between a system with a closed program and one with 
conditional or unconditional reflexes) which he also 
formulated in research paper at VUNP “Uvod do 
kybernetiky pro ekonomicke aplikace” (introduction to 
cybernetics for applied economics). (1964.) 
During the preparation and implementation of the new 
economic system the concept of the plan and its role in a 
system based on the market mechanism were questioned. 
One of these questions relates to the compatibility of the 
price mechanism with planned management of the economy. 
We should also ask whether it is necessary to first eliminate 
disequilibria by the old methods and then initiate the new 
management system or the other way around; whether the 
plan will play substantially the same role in the new system 
as in the old; and, finally whether the old planning methods 
are at all compatible with the new management system? 
At first, answers to these questions diverged widely but today 
there are some answers on which the majority of economists 
agree. However, there is still no agreement about the role of 
the plan, and about the methods and forms of planning that 
would be consistent with the new management system. It is 
not my intention to answer here all these questions in detail, 
I just want to focus on the role of the plan using what we 
may call the cybernetic approach to the problem, that is to 
view the role and the forms of the plan from the standpoint 
of information flows, decision making processes, degree of 
organization, and goal seeking behavior.  
If we assume that the socialist economy is a system with goal-
seeking behavior, that is there exists an agency of central 
management, which consciously attempts to regulate the 
economic development in order to reach certain social goals, 
then the plan must provide us with 
(1) the goal at which economic development aims; 
(2) a forecast of  feasible paths of economic 
development; 
(3) the program of actions for economic units 
Plan as a Goal 
Generally, it is not necessary, and it is hardly the rule that 
the goal at which a system with goal-seeking behavior aims is 
formulated explicitly. Often the goal is built into the 
structure of the system so that the system demonstrates goal-
seeking behavior without being aware of it or in other words 
without being goal-conscious. Many non-socialist economic 
systems function in this way, but the socialist countries 
formulate their goals explicitly.  The first phase in 
formulating social goals is a sociopolitical matter, and in the 
economic field it is a matter of economic policies. Targets 
formulated in this way should be the basis for choosing one 
of the possible programs of actions. But, if they are 
formulated only in their most general form, such as, for 
example, securing a maximal growth of living standards, the 
development of socialist democracy, etc., it is difficult to use 
them as criteria for decisions that people and economic units 
(enterprises, etc.) make. Without additional information a 
worker on the job or even a manager of an enterprise, would 
have difficulty to decide which of their possible actions would 
better correspond to the goals of society as a whole. In the 
present system of economic management this problem was 
solved by giving every economic unit a concrete 
quantitatively precise target. The role, of transforming the 
general social goals into specific targets for individual 
industries, enterprises, etc., was played by the economic plan. 
Coordination of activities of economic units with social goals 
was accomplished by imposing the plan as a mandatory 
directive; its fulfillment was a duty, which was further 
reinforced by a system of material incentives for plan 
fulfillment. 
Such an approach assumes that 
1) only the central agency can ascertain which actions 
of subordinate units are in harmony with the social 
goals of the socialist economy;  
2) the central agency has sufficient information and a 
suitable algorithm for fixing concrete targets for 
subordinate units correctly; 
3) economic units cannot fulfill social goals on their 
own without the plan as an intermediary; 
4) these units have no interest in fulfilling the social 
goals directly. 
Today we can see that these assumptions are obviously 
incorrect; which does not necessarily mean that their 
opposites are true. To use the plan as concretized goals may 
be to a certain extent and under certain circumstances 
useful. But in majority of cases target mediation by the plan 
can be directly harmful. 
This negative side of target mediation by the plan is one of 
the important points of criticism brought against the old 
management system and also against the old concept of the 
role of the plan. In the past, the awareness that the concrete 
targets fixed by the plan, were only means of reaching more 
general goals, was obliterated. Instead the plan fulfillment 
became an aim, or an end in itself. Once the plan had been 
fixed, its fulfillment became the criterion for judging the   
satisfaction of social needs, rather than social interests being 
the criterion of how beneficial was the plan fulfillment. 
Objections could be raised here as to the accuracy of this 
statement, since it can be argued that five-year plans were 
never valid for the whole period of five years, and annual 
plans in the later years of the five-year plan deviated from 
the original plan. But these deviations were due only partly 
to the awareness of disharmony of the plan with social goals; 
rather they often deviated because the original plan was 
unrealizable. 
If we consider our limited information gathering and 
processing capacity, the fact that the center often obtains 
purposely distorted information, and that there has never 
been a perfectly accurate and faultless algorithm for creating 
an optimal plan, then we must admit that, even if the 
planning bodies work from correctly determined social goals, 
the plan can never be constructed without mistakes. That is 
to say, there is no guarantee that as judged by social goals 
any action other than the one prescribed by the plan is worse 
than an action leading to plan fulfillment. All the more so, 
since the plan is constructed under assumptions about 
development of economic conditions which may or may not 
take place. 
Reality practically always deviates from the conditions 
assumed by the plan. Thus, we can say that it is possible to 
equate plan fulfillment with the satisfaction of social goals, 
only if we completely overlook the laws of economic 
information and decision-making processes. If we pay due 
regard to these laws, however, we shall discover that not only 
is the statement valid, but that an endeavor to fulfill the plan 
accurately may actually contradict the social goals.  From 
what we have just said it does not follow at all that every 
non-fulfillment of the plan is correct. Thus the question 
arises how do we know when the deviation from the plan is 
socially useful and when it is not? Perhaps this is impossible 
to know so that it may be better not to admit any deviations 
whatsoever. But this question is put wrongly, because it is 
still based on the assumption that the plan is the direct aim 
of the activities of enterprises. 
The new management system is based on the idea that it is 
possible to create a situation within the economy in which the 
goals of the economic units are directly harmonized with 
social goals. In other words, that it is possible to achieve a 
direct harmony between group and social interests and that 
this harmony need not be achieved through the mediation of 
the plan fulfillment. This is a substantial difference between 
the proposed new management system and the reform of the 
old system in 1958. All that concerned us at that time was 
improving the system of plan fulfillment through incentives. 
The new system tries to put the market mechanism to action, 
because only in this way does the producer become 
responsive to satisfying the need of the consumer. A price 
change and the subsequent change in gross income causes the 
individual aim of the producer (to maximize gross income) to 
correspond to the short-run social goal (to maximize the 
satisfaction of the consumer). This of course is valid, if the 
producer does not enjoy the advantage of a monopoly. 
However, it is always possible to restrict monopoly 
conditions substantially by central interventions’.  Under the 
old management system, it was difficult to really make the 
producer interested in fulfilling the plan and it was not clear 
to what extent the plan really corresponded to needs. Thus, a 
two-fold deviation was possible which caused a conflict 
between production and consumption. The producer’s 
interest to deviate from the plan was accompanied by an 
interest to satisfy the consumer better. 
At this point it may be useful to examine relation between 
direct and indirect methods of control. In past discussions 
the use of indirect methods was very often questioned since 
the use of direct ones was considered simpler. This, however, 
is true only if control per se is the aim. We need central 
control only for achieving some, not all social goals. For 
example the fast adjustment of production to changes in 
consumption is best performed by the indirect control 
methods that do establish a direct link between the interests 
of producers and consumers. On the other hand, with direct 
control methods it is possible to achieve a harmonization of 
interests only indirectly through mediation by plan. 
Consumer demand should be subordinated to the plan only 
if spontaneous producer-consumer interaction would 
contradict the goals of socialist society. The plan has the 
important role of harmonizing interests if the goal is to 
achieve such volume and structure of production that would 
suit consumers’ demand and simultaneously create 
conditions for a further rapid economic development, which 
implies necessity to create production capacities in suitable 
proportions. But investment construction is a long-term 
process. The plan as the information about probable future 
needs is thus a necessary basis for the decisions that are to 
ensure dynamic equilibrium. So conceived, the plan will 
serve to reach the aim but it will not itself become the aim. 
Only through the central balancing of the plan is it possible 
to acquire information how the approximate overall demand 
for, the production of specific products will develop. But this 
information should not be used as a directive, because the 
important thing is to produce what is really needed and not 
merely what was planned. 
Related issue is the question how to evaluate the outcomes of 
economic development. In discussions the following 
argument was aimed at the new economic system: with free 
prices it will not be possible to evaluate precisely how well 
specific enterprises or branches fulfill the plan. This 
argument, of course, again pays homage to the old concept 
that the plan is a fixed target point and any deviation from it 
is economically unfavorable. In reality, the target, in view of 
changing conditions, is variable. Thus, it is sensible to 
evaluate results relative to a variable target and not measure 
them against an ossified plan. If we know that an enterprise 
fulfills the plan by 102% or 99%, this still does not say 
anything about whether it produces really useful and needed 
products. The evaluation of the enterprise according to the 
percentages of plan fulfillment implies the replacement of 
real goals by the plan. 
The plan as a forecast of economic development  
This function of the plan has been greatly underestimated in 
the past. It used to be emphasized that plans are more than 
merely prognoses of economic development that they 
actually determine how the economy is going to develop. In a 
centrally planned economy the plan cannot be on1y a 
prognosis but, on the other hand, a plan that is not also a 
forecast of future development, cannot be realizable. 
Experiences show that none of the five-year plans remained 
valid for five years. This means that these plans contained 
incorrect predictions of the possible development of the 
economy. 
Economic development depends on both objective and 
subjective factors, which can be broadly classified as 
follows:  
1.Conditions that are independent of the human will 
(i.e.. natural causes); 
2. Conditions, which during the construction of the 
plan, must be taken as given and are also considered to 
be objective conditions, yet they also depend on levels 
of human activity (such as technology, consumption of 
raw materials per unit of output, labor productivity, 
etc.); 
3. Conditions of a subjective character (consumer 
preferences);  
4. Central economic decisions. 
If consumers’ preferences are to be respected, then 
conditions 1 to 3 must be considered exogenous during the 
plan’s construction. It is, of course, possible to consider only 
1 and 2 as exogenous, and decide the structure of 
consumption centrally rather than give people freedom of 
consumer choice. But such an approach would contradict the 
goals of socialism. 
If the plan is to be realistic, it must be based on the 
prediction of changes in exogenous factors. The central body 
can decide only within the bounds given by exogenous 
factors. If these factors were to determine deve1opment 
uniquely there would be no room for central decisions, so 
that every plan going beyond forecast, would create 
economic disturbances. This is fortunately not the case and 
exogenous factors leave enough room for central decisions to 
influence the economic development according to social 
goals. 
But even here it is true that the plan must start from the 
forecast of exogenous factors and central decision can 
operate only within the boundaries these factors permit. By 
crossing these boundaries the plan would become 
unrealizable, and instead of providing coordination, it would 
spread chaos in the economy. 
A completely accurate prediction of the changes in 
exogenous factors is never possible for the following reasons: 
Planning activity in the center is based on very limited 
information about the past and present state of the economy. 
This is caused by the restricted capacity of the center for 
receiving, storing and processing information. Also, during 
the transmission to the center information gets distorted 
(whether intentional or not).  
The limitation and distortion of information increases the 
indeterminacy of decisions about the future development of 
exogenous factors. This appears, for instance, during the 
operation with aggregated magnitudes. When the weights of 
various components are being changed it is difficult to 
foresee the consequences of these changes. 
Exogenous factors are interdependent so that during their 
development they influence each other in a complex way. A 
full description and calculation of these mutual influences is 
practically impossible. Thus, it is possible to consider only 
the most important effects and abstract, from the others. But 
this again heightens the indeterminacy of predictions.  
In the development of exogenous factors there always exists 
an unavoidable amount of, unexpected influences, which 
cannot be predicted accurately, even if we knew the perfect 
algorithms for forecasting.  Such fortuitous influences 
include changes in weather which influence significantly the 
crops and thus the whole economy; international trade and 
political situation which, through demands on the 
armaments industry and size of the army, can strongly 
influence the economy, and lastly, changes in the tastes of the 
population, such as various fashion trends, etc. One of the 
most important factors in the economy, which is very 
difficult to predict, is the development of science, and 
changes in technology. Often there are sudden new and 
unexpected discoveries in science, which can substantially 
change production technology. On the other hand expected 
breakthroughs do not necessarily happen.     
From what has been said, it follows that any forecast can 
only be of the probabilistic nature. From this in turn follows 
that the plan that is based on such forecasts can be only a 
probabilistic and not a deterministic plan. The plan can 
predict only with certain probability that some volume of 
production will correspond to the future needs of society. 
This probability is smaller the longer is the period for which 
the plan is made 
Instead of fixing one plan figure, it might be more 
appropriate, to find the probability distributions of desired 
quantities of products. This, of course, would involve 
enormous effort. It might be more feasible to find floors and 
cei1ings for planned indicators. The planned indicators 
would then fall between these two limits with high 
probability. 
The probabilistic concept of the plan is closely related to 
what have been already said about the relation between the 
plan and social goals in the old and new systems. The fact 
that it is possible to draw the plan only in the probabilistic 
sense results from the nature of information processes and 
therefore, it is valid under any circumstances. If the plan has 
been constructed deterministically, than the indeterminacy 
resulting from the impossibility of perfect forecast 
was eliminated by an arbitrary decision of the central 
planning body, which did something that is beyond its 
powers. A deterministic formulation of the plan cannot be 
based on information that does not exist, it is thus in that 
degree arbitrary and cannot have proper coordinating 
function. The elimination of uncertainties, which remain in 
the plan, due to the impossibility of an accurate forecast, can 
make sense only if it is based on additional information. 
This means that during economic development, the plan 
should be corrected whenever the new information is 
available. Additional information can be obtained also by 
combining central and decentralized decisions. Thus, the 
demand for constancy and compulsory character of the plan 
targets contradicts the goals it is supposed to achieve. The 
plan must be supplemented by a process of flexible 
adaptation to changing conditions, by a mechanism reacting 
to unforeseen changes and by a mechanism of fine tuning of 
the plan according to conditions which have not and could 
not have been foreseen when it was originally made. 
The Plan as a Program for Actions. 
The program of a system with goal-seeking behavior must 
contain either decisions about its activities or the method of 
making decisions (algorithm) given the information about 
the changes in the environment in which is the system 
situated and goals of the system. The plan as the program for 
actions is thus based on the plan as a goal and the plan as a 
forecast. In other words, it is necessary to determine a 
program of actions, which given the assumptions about the 
development of exogenous economic factors, will lead to 
achievement of the specified goals. 
In systems with goal-seeking behavior we encounter several 
qualitatively different types of programs. With some 
simplification we can classify them into following three 
groups: 
1.Systems with a closed program. 
2.Systems with unconditional reflexes. 
3.Systems with conditional ref1exes (learning systems). 
This differentiation is based on the relation between the 
decision-making algorithm and the information received 
from the environment.  Systems with a closed program have 
no input of information from the environment. Their activity 
is given exclusively by the program, which must contain all 
necessary information and decisions for all the subsequent 
activities of the system. 
A system with unconditional reflexes contains in its program 
algorithm according to which decisions are made based on 
currently received information from its environment. In this 
case the actions of the system are not all determined by the 
program ahead of time without possibility of change, only 
the algorithm is permanently fixed. A system with 
unconditional reflexes is therefore capable of changing its 
activity depending on changes in its environment but it 
always reacts in the same way. 
The learning systems (with conditional reflexes) use 
information not only for its decisions according to a given 
algorithm, but also for determining the extent to which their 
decisions correspond to the goal criterion. The program does 
not provide a permanent algorithm but, rather, means by 
which the decision-making algorithm can be adapted to serve 
better the goals of the system. This group also includes 
systems that can adjust their organizational structure and 
adapt it to changing conditions (so-called self-organizing 
systems).     
Before we discuss these three types of programs further, let 
us observe that at present the economic plan belongs to the 
first type (more precisely, it has a closed program character), 
whereas the new Czechoslovak economic system is presumed 
to have the character of the third type of program. This of 
course does not depend only on the plan itself but primarily 
on the character of the system in which it operates. 
 To clarify matters, let us take an example from the sphere of 
machinery. A music box is a system with a c1osed 
program part of which is contained directly in its structure 
and part in the cylinder. An electronic gadget like the well-
known tortoise may be a system with conditional reflexes. 
The music box can play another tune if another cylinder is 
put into it but no change of cylinders will make it a system 
with conditional ref1exes. The incapability of processing data 
from outside which follows from its relatively primitive 
structures will prevent this. On the other hand, it would 
certainly be senseless to put a closed program into the above-
mentioned  electronic gadget. The same can be said about 
economic systems. A certain character of the plan as .a 
program corresponds to a certain organizational structure 
and control system (which is often called a “model” 
according to Brus). To change the character of the program 
assumes the creation of a new “model”.  It would be equally 
senseless to program the new economic system with the old 
types of plans, just as it is senseless to program a computer 
with a cylinder from a music box. 
The differences in the three types of programs lie primarily 
in the quantities of information they require. Let us assume 
that we are concerned with a five-year plan. If it is a closed 
program, it must contain initially all the information 
necessary for the entire five years of activity. A closed 
program must from the beginning eliminate all degrees of 
uncertainty. It is obvious that with extensive and complex 
systems such a program would have to contain an immense 
amount of information. Because information contained in the 
plan cannot be created from nothing but can only come out 
of processing the information transmitted by the economy, 
planning, as closed programming of economic development, 
requires as a consequence an extremely great amount of 
administrative work and administrative apparatus. This in 
turn produces further problems, because the transmission of 
information in such an apparatus is slow and the 
information becomes distorted. 
Even though the plan was, according to the old system, 
substantially a closed program, it was a little improved by 
occasional response to current information however; the 
response was performed by centrally prescribed algorithms. 
To this extent the plan was a combination of a closed 
program and a program with unconditional reflexes.  
A system with a closed program must initially contain a 
built-in forecast of the development of the environment for 
the entire period of its functioning, because once it has been 
started, it functions “blindly.” 
On the other hand, higher types of programs assume that 
information is being transmitted to the system during its 
functioning not only by the program but also by the 
environment. Thus, the program may contain much less 
information and its creation does not require as much 
administrative work. Of course, requirements on the quality 
of information processing, and the decision-making 
connected with it, are greater. Also, the subsystems, which 
are directed by this type of program, must have more 
complex algorithms for decision-making. It is simpler to 
decide about production in an enterprise, if the volume and 
the assortment of production, supplies of raw materials and 
investment, the number of employees, price and average 
wages, etc., are prescribed from above than if one obtains a 
plan from above which must be elaborated on the basis of 
one’s own market analysis, technology, and so on 
In systems with the higher types of program, requirements 
for accuracy of forecast are not so great or, rather, the 
probability concept of plan is more compatible with them 
then with systems having closed programs. Systems, which 
learn, or self-organizing systems know how to react to 
unforeseen circumstances and adjust their behavior 
accordingly. There are differences also in the requirements 
on the environment in which the systems operate. Since a 
system with a closed program “works” blindly, a1l deviations 
in the real state of the environment from the predicted state, 
have disturbing effects. As long as disturbances do not 
surpass certain boundaries, the whole system functions 
according to its program and does not react to the changed 
conditions at all. It can happen however, that the actions of 
the system become senseless, that it loses its original purpose 
becomes an end in itself or brings results, differing from the 
ones originally intended. The action of such a system can, in 
the end, lead to results quite contrary to those which were 
aimed for. A clock, running in a deserted, bombed house is 
paradoxical. The cycle of an automatic factory in Lem’s 
“Planet Eden” is nonsensical.  It produces perfectly, but for 
no one; it solves its products once they were completed and 
produces the superfluous products again. 
When the disturbing influences cross certain boundaries, 
however, the system with a closed program breaks down and 
is no longer able to function. Systems with higher types of 
programs on the other hand) can adapt themselves even to 
unforeseen circumstances, functioning equally well, or even 
better. It is these unexpected and unforeseen changes in the 
environment that affect the highest types of systems and 
become the source of their inner changes, their self-
organization and qualitative development. 
Such systems in an environment rich with random changes 
and impulses, often develop and improve themselves faster 
than those which function in quiet unchangeable one. Closed 
program systems do not have the capability of spontaneous 
internal improvement and for them maximum isolation from 
the surrounding environment is ideal. Any random changes 
are considered negative and threaten their function. Systems 
-which learn and are self-organizing know how to suppress 
negative consequences of random influences and exploit all 
arising positive changes for their development and 
improvement. They adapt themselves to changes in the 
environment and know how to maintain dynamic stability 
The same can be said about the plan. As long as the plan is a 
closed program, the economy is hardly adaptive to random, 
unforeseen changes coming from the environment. 
Fluctuations in the weather, changes in international politics 
and changing circumstances in foreign trade have a very 
unfavorable effect on the economy. The rigidity and 
compulsory nature of the plan do not permit utilization of 
random circumstances -- such as new, unexpected, scientific 
and technological inventions --as a source of progressive 
development. Every new discovery invention or innovation, 
which has not been reckoned with in advance in, the plan, 
can be put into practice only with great difficulties. The 
extensive development of the economy and the slow technical 
progress has not been caused by the ignorance or ill will of 
people but by the above-mentioned role of the plan. 
 
